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LABOR RIGHTS IN THE GENERALIZED 
SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: A 20-YEAR 
REVIEW 
Lance Compaf and Jeffrey S. Vogt t t 
L INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 1982, a small group of labor, religious, and human 
rights activists began charting a new course for human rights and 
workers' rights in American trade policy. The principles of these 
labor rights advocates were straightforward: 
1. No country should attract investment or gain an edge in 
international trade by violating workers' rights; 
2. No company operating in global trade should gain a competitive 
edge by violating workers' rights; and, 
3. Workers have a right to demand protection for labor rights in 
the international trade system, and to have laws to accomplish it.1 
The coalition that took shape 20 years ago made a labor rights 
amendment to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the 
chief policy vehicle in U.S. law to promote these principles. This 
article reviews 20 years' experience with the GSP labor rights clause. 
Following this introduction, Part II recounts the legislative process 
t Senior Lecturer, Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Ithaca, 
New York. 
t t Assistant General Counsel, International Labor Rights Fund, Washington, D.C. 
1. The labor rights planning meetings were hosted by Pharis Harvey, a Methodist 
missionary recently returned from years of work with grass roots social service groups in Asia, 
and by Bill Goold, then legislative assistant to Ohio congressman Don Pease. They were joined 
by trade unionists, including Lee Price (United Auto Workers), Barbara Shailor (International 
Association of Machinists), Stan Gacek (United Food and Commercial Workers), Ben Davis 
(American Federation of Government Employees), Jack Sheehan (United Steel Workers), and 
Steve Beckman (AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department); human rights activists like Holly 
Burkhalter of Americas Watch and John Cavanagh of the Institute for Policy Studies; academics 
like Terry Collingsworth of Loyola University Law School; and, retired Labor Department 
officials like David Williams and Jack Buchanek, whose labor rights interests went back to the 
1950s. They later produced a book containing detailed arguments for their position. See 
CAVANAGH ET AL., TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS: WORKER RIGHTS IN A CHANGING W O R L D 
ECONOMY (1988). Williams and Buchanek are now deceased; Sheehan is retired. The rest are 
involved in new levels of responsibility and leadership in international labor rights advocacy. 
199 
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that resulted in passage of the GSP labor rights amendment. Part III 
examines briefly other labor rights clauses in U.S. trade laws inspired 
by the GSP clause, as well as workers' rights dimensions in bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral trade arrangements, and in corporate codes 
of conduct. 
Part IV is the heart of the article. After presenting summary 
information about GSP labor cases since the passage of the workers' 
rights clause, Part IV focuses on detailed case studies of 6 countries: 
Chile, Guatemala, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Belarus. These 
cases demonstrate the cross-cutting human rights, diplomatic, and 
economic policy complexities in applying the GSP labor rights clause. 
To conclude, Part V acknowledges salient criticisms of the GSP 
labor rights regime and agrees that the law and its application have 
been flawed. But the willingness of the United States to act 
unilaterally, most pointedly in the GSP context, has driven a process 
of bilateral, regional, and multilateral action to promote workers' 
rights in trade that goes far beyond the GSP program. We conclude 
that, on balance, the GSP workers' rights clause has been an 
important instrument in international labor affairs that has yielded 
concrete positive results for workers in many instances. Flaws in the 
law and its application should inspire further efforts to improve it, not 
to abandon it. 
The labor rights advocacy coalition that began meeting in the 
early 1980s was inspired by economic and political developments of 
the time. Multinational corporations were shutting down workplaces 
throughout the United States and transferring jobs to overseas 
facilities where workers' rights were brutally suppressed by 
authoritarian governments.2 Then-President Ronald Reagan's 
administration selectively favored independent unions in communist 
countries like Solidarity in Poland, but undermined independent 
unions that challenged employers and governments in right-wing 
military-dominated countries like Korea, South Africa, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries that 
were centers of U.S. investment, joint ventures, and subcontractor 
suppliers to U.S. firms.3 
2. See, e.g., RICHARD J. BARNET & RONALD E. MUELLER, GLOBAL REACH: T H E POWER 
OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1974); CHARLES LEVINSON, INTERNATIONAL 
T RADE UNIONISM (1972); FOR A NEW LABOUR INTERNATIONALISM (Peter Waterman ed., 
1984). 
3. See, e.g., Simon Rodberg, The CIO without the CIA, T H E AMERICAN PROSPECT, Vol. 
12, No. 12, July 2, 2001, supp., Globalism and its Critics, at 27; HOBART A. SPALDING, 
ORGANIZED LABOR IN LATIN AMERICA (1977); WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE, O U R OWN BACK 
YARD: T H E UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA, 1977-1992 (2000). 
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The advocates' group was also concerned by the narrow trade 
policy position of many unions. "Stop Imports" and "Buy American" 
were the most prominent trade calls from the labor movement. Union 
members' political energies went into various protectionist bills that 
had little chance of passage by Congress.4 Rather than advocating 
human rights and labor rights, Labor Day celebrations in the 70s and 
80s sometimes featured the communal smashing of foreign-made 
products—an entire Japanese car, in some cases.5 To address these 
problems, advocates proposed an amendment to the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) that would make benefits under the 
GSP program conditioned on respect for workers' rights. 
The GSP is a centerpiece of U.S. trade policy, providing 
preferential duty-free entry for more than 4,650 products from 
approximately 140 designated beneficiary countries and territories.6 
The purpose of the tariff preference is to give developing countries 
greater access to U.S. markets, aiding the economic development of 
those poorer countries.7 Advocates argued that a labor rights clause 
in the GSP would ensure minimum fair labor standards for workers as 
a condition of preferential access. 
Advocates acknowledged that a natural comparative advantage 
in lower labor costs due to a country's level of development is 
acceptable in global trade. Such advantage is not acceptable, 
however, if obtained by jailing or murdering workers who try to 
organize unions, denying workers political rights, using the work of 
young children, discriminating against women and ethnic minorities, 
or ignoring life-threatening health and safety hazards in the 
workplace. Further, lower labor costs should not result from the 
deliberate suppression of wages and working conditions below levels 
that workers' productivity should yield to them, while small economic 
and political elite reaps the benefits of their labor. Workers in 
developing countries should share the gains from enhanced access to 
the U.S. consumer market. Moreover, they must have a voice in 
4. See I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 175-76 (3d ed. 1995). 
5. Alan Goldstein, Japan: Digging In, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991, at Bus. 11. 
Unions, however, were not alone. Members of Congress deeply offended Japan by publicly 
smashing Toshiba radios with sledgehammers. Id. 
6. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF 
PREFERENCES GUIDEBOOK iii (1999), available at http://www.ustr.gov/pdf/gspintro.pdf. 
7. GSP Renewal Act of 1984, H.R. Rep. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 11 (1984) 
(explaining that the GSP was designed to provide temporary, unilateral grants of preferences by 
developed countries to developing countries; to extend benefits to sectors of developing 
countries that were not competitive internationally; and, to include safeguard mechanisms to 
protect domestic industries sensitive to import competition from articles receiving preferential 
tariff treatment). 
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shaping economic development policies and social protection through 
trade unions and political participation. 
A labor rights clause in the GSP was adopted by Congress and 
signed by President Ronald Reagan on October 30,1984, taking effect 
in the GSP Renewal Act of 1984.8 From then on, a country's 
beneficial status under the GSP was linked to whether it was "taking 
steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights."9 The bill set 
forth the following 5-part definition of such rights, which has been 
repeated many times in other U.S. trade laws: 
1. the right of association; 
2. the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
3. a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory 
labor; 
4. a minimum age for the employment of children; and, 
5. acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, 
hours of work, and occupational safety and health.10 
Just as important as the labor rights provision in the law was the 
adoption by the USTR of regulations and procedural guidelines for 
filing petitions to challenge a country's GSP status due to labor rights 
violations.11 The regulations first established a threshold to determine 
whether to accept or reject a petition for review.12 If accepted, the 
USTR would proceed to an investigation. This mechanism made it 
possible for workers, trade unions, and religious and human rights 
allies in the United States to collaborate with their foreign 
counterparts to investigate working conditions and to file complaints. 
Procedures included public hearings and other forums to present 
evidence and argue for the removal or suspension of trade benefits 
because of abuses against workers.13 
II. LEGISLATIVE LESSONS 
Passage of the 1984 GSP labor rights amendment carried 
important lessons about the legislative process.14 First, it required a 
8. GSP Renewal Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3019 (1984). 
9. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2462(b)(2)(G) (West 1999). 
10. Id. § 2467(4)(A-E). 
11. Regulations of the U.S. Trade Representative Pertaining to Eligibility of Articles and 
Countries for the Generalized System of Preference Program, 15 C.F.R. § 2007 et seq. (2002). 
12. 15 C.F.R. § 2007.2(a)-(b). 
13. Id. § 2007.2(d). 
14. This account of the lobbying and legislative process is based on author Compa's 
participation in the labor-religious-NGO coalition pursuing passage of the GSP labor rights 
clause. 
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legislative champion. Congressman Don Pease was a high-ranking 
member of the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, often described as the most powerful committee in 
Congress. He made international labor rights a personal cause and 
gave his staff a mandate to develop a GSP workers' rights provision. 
Democrats controlled the House of Representatives in the 1980's, 
permitting pro-labor initiatives to get off the ground. Rep. Pease also 
had friendly relations with influential committee Republicans. He 
was perfectly positioned to push labor rights legislation through the 
committee system to the floor of Congress. Moreover, he was able to 
convince the Republicans that supporting a labor rights clause in the 
GSP gave them a chance to cast a pro-labor vote and to tell their 
constituents that they were doing something on trade for workers. 
The GSP labor rights provision that ultimately emerged, 
however, reflected negotiation and compromise. Congressional 
Democrats could have passed any version of a labor rights 
amendment over Republican opposition. However, the Republican 
administration could veto it. A painful compromise took shape in 
negotiations with Reagan administration officials. The administration 
wanted to cut from the original draft a clause prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. It 
also sought to change the mandatory sanctions clause in the draft bill, 
which would require the immediate suspension of GSP benefits for a 
country found to be systematically violating workers' rights. Instead, 
the administration wanted flexibility in deciding whether to apply 
suspension of benefits, depending on larger geopolitical and foreign 
policy considerations. 
The administration's demands had their basis in domestic and 
international politics. Some officials in the administration feared 
souring relations with allied oil-producing states where discrimination 
against women and non-Muslims is prevalent. Others did not want to 
subject Israel to criticism over the treatment of Palestinian workers. 
Still others had vague unfounded concerns that non-discrimination 
provisions in U.S. trade laws might revive the recently defeated Equal 
Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.15 
Administration officials also insisted on language to soften the 
mandatory suspension of rights violators. Instead of requiring full 
compliance or an immediate cutoff of benefits, their proposal would 
require countries to be "taking steps" to afford workers' rights, 
15. For a discussion on some of these points, see Karen Travis, Women in Global 
Production and Worker Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Laws, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 173 (1992). 
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without defining how many steps, whether steps had to be taken in 
any or all of the 5-part definition of such rights, or how far the steps 
had to go to meet requirements of the law. The administration 
wanted maximum discretion in applying the law to serve geopolitical 
and foreign policy interests. 
The labor rights coalition and the sponsors of the GSP workers' 
rights amendment faced a difficult decision. Should they reject 
administration demands and press for a strong undiluted bill that 
would likely face a veto by the President? With new elections set for 
November 1984, perhaps a Democratic victory in the race for the 
White House would see their original draft become law under a new 
President. Or should they compromise, accepting a version without 
the non-discrimination and immediate compliance provisions—the 
proverbial half a loaf? 
After passionate debate inside their coalition, the labor rights 
advocates chose the compromise. In view of the 1984 Reagan 
electoral landslide that followed, their half-a-loaf strategy was correct. 
Congress dropped the non-discrimination clause from the definition 
of internationally recognized workers' rights and inserted the "taking 
steps" language into the amendment, giving the administration wide 
latitude for applying economic sanctions against workers' rights 
violators. However, advocates gained a new forum for filing 
complaints, presenting evidence, and getting decisions for workers 
victimized by labor rights violations. 
III. RIPPLE EFFECTS 
The GSP is a limited program affecting a small portion of total 
U.S. trade. As GATT negotiations in the "Tokyo Round" and the 
"Uruguay Round" gradually cut tariff levels generally, the economic 
benefit to developing countries of the GSP's lower tariffs was reduced. 
But the impact of the GSP labor rights clause reaches far beyond 
immediate economic effects. A country's eligibility for GSP is an 
important marker for U.S. trade negotiators, trade policy makers, and 
multinational executives and investors. Loss of GSP beneficiary 
status sends them a strong signal that a country is potentially bad 
business. Developing countries that desire unfettered access to the 
U.S. market do not want to end up on a U.S. list of labor rights 
violators. Besides losing GSP benefits, they would face sanctions 
under other trade programs with labor rights amendments. 
The labor rights amendment in the GSP fixed into U.S. law and 
policy both the principle of a labor rights-trade linkage and the 
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practice of applying it. Passage of the GSP labor rights amendment in 
1984 was followed by over a half-dozen other amendments where the 
United States injected labor rights conditionality into trade 
relationships with other countries. 
• In 1985, Congress added a labor rights provision to legislation 
governing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), which provides political risk insurance for U.S. 
companies investing overseas.16 Under the new labor rights 
clause, such insurance can only be provided in countries "taking 
steps to adopt and implement laws that extend" internationally 
recognized workers' rights, using the 5-part definition from the 
GSP law. Determinations made in the GSP petition and review 
process are also applied to OPIC beneficiaries.17 
• In 1988, Congress made the labor rights trade linkage a 
principal U.S. negotiating objective in "fast track" legislation, 
authorizing the President to undertake multilateral trade 
negotiations. The Republican Congress deleted the labor rights 
clause from "fast track" legislation in 1997, leading to the 
historic first time defeat of a fast track trade bill. 
• In the same Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, a labor rights 
amendment to Section 301 used the 5-part GSP definition to 
make systematic workers' rights violations by any trading 
partner an unfair trade practice against which the United States 
could retaliate with economic sanctions. 
• In 1990, a Caribbean Basin Initiative renewal bill adopted the 
GSP labor rights formulation.20 The same clause was applied to 
the Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991. 
• In 1992, Congress swiftly enacted a bill barring the Agency for 
International Development (AID) from expending funds to 
help developing countries lure U.S. businesses to countries 
where workers' right are violated.22 Passage of the AID labor 
rights bill followed hard-hitting exposes on TV newsmagazines 
shortly before the 1992 elections, in which producers posing as 
businessmen recorded U.S. AID officials touting anti-union 
blacklists and anti-labor repression as attractive features of the 
Central American maquila zones.23 
16. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191a(a)(l) (West 1990). 
17. Id. § 2191a(a)(2). 
18. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Causes and Consequences of Fast-Track Defeat, J. OF COM., 
Nov. 14.1997, at 7A. 
19. 19 U.S.C.A. § 241 l(d)(3)(B)(iii)(I-V) (West 1999). 
20. Id. § 2702(b)(7). 
21. Id. § 3202(c)(7). 
22. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151 (West Supp. 2002). 
23. 60 Minutes: Hiring Rosa Martinez (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 27, 1992); Nightline: 
Paying to Lose Our Jobs (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 29-30, 1992). 
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• In 1994, Congress turned labor rights attention to the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other 
international financial institutions. Congressmen Bernard 
Sanders of Vermont and Barney Frank of Massachusetts 
secured an amendment to the law governing U.S. participation 
in those bodies that requires American directors to use their 
"voice and vote" to screen loan proposals for their effects on 
workers' rights.24 
• In 1997, Congress amended the Tariff Act of 1930, which 
already prohibited imports produced by prison labor by adding 
a child labor provision.25 The new law declared that the same 
ban applies to products made by forced or indentured child 
labor. 
• In 2000, Congress passed the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act, which authorized the President to designate a sub-Saharan 
African country as eligible for trade preferences if he 
determines that the country has established or is making 
continual progress toward the protection of internationally 
recognized worker rights using the GSP's 5-part definition.26 
Besides setting the precedent for labor rights clauses in 
unilaterally applied U.S. trade statutes and related programs, the GSP 
law promoted broader approaches to labor rights in trade agreements. 
U.S. willingness to act alone has driven a process of expanded 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral treatment of workers' rights in 
trade and investment regimes. It also prompted the emergence of 
new corporate codes of conduct on workers' rights and created an 
infrastructure of workers' rights advocates in developing countries 
who could monitor such codes. 
The supplemental labor agreement in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was one such outcome.27 The opening of 
talks on a hemispheric trade pact, the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas (FTAA), also generated new advocacy for workers' rights.28 
To avoid unilateral GSP scrutiny, Jordan and Cambodia negotiated 
bilateral workers' rights clauses with the United States promising fair 
treatment of workers as part of an agreement granting them greater 
access to U.S. markets.29 
24. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 262p-4p (West Supp. 2002). 
25. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1307 (West Supp. 2002). 
26. 19 U.S.C. § 3703(a)(1)(F) (West Supp. 2002). 
27. Detailed information on the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC), including the full text, can be obtained from the North American Commission for 
Labor Cooperation, at http://www.naalc.org. 
28. See, e.g., Alliance for Responsible Trade, located online, at http://www.art-us.org. 
29. Gary Yerkey, Senate Approves Free Trade Pact with Jordan, Clearing Way for 
Approval, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Sept. 25, 2001, at A-8; Chris Rugaber, U.S.-Cambodia 
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Labor rights have penetrated the governance of international 
financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.30 The United 
States and other countries have pushed for labor rights on the agenda 
of the World Trade Organization.31 The WTO has so far resisted this 
move, but WTO opposition propelled a new declaration on "core 
labor standards" by the ILO.32 In a more defensive mode, labor rights 
advocates were part of an international coalition that halted approval 
of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in part for its 
failure to sufficiently protect workers' rights.33 
The late 1990s saw a dramatic growth of corporate codes of 
conduct on protection for workers' rights.34 Both individual 
companies and "stakeholder" groups that include companies, trade 
unions, human rights groups, consumer organizations, and other 
NGOs have developed codes of conduct for subsidiaries and 
subcontractors in developing countries. They also set up monitoring 
systems to ensure that codes are respected.35 
Textile Pact Extended, Despite Criticisms of Labor Provisions, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 8, 
2002, at A-4 (criticisms were leveled by textile companies objecting to workers' rights provisions 
in the accord). 
30. WORLD BANK, CORE LABOR STANDARDS AND THE W O R L D BANK (July 2000), 
available at http://www.worldbank.org; IMF, DEBT RELIEF, GLOBALIZATION AND IMF 
REFORM: SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (April 12,2000), available at http://www.imf.org. 
31. The trade labor linkage was pushed aggressively by the Clinton Administration in 
Seattle, generating much debate. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse & Joseph Kahn, Talks and 
Turmoil: Workers' Rights; U.S. Effort to Add Labor Standards to Agenda Fails, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 3, 1999, at Al; John Burgess & Rene Sanchez, Clinton s Remarks on Sanctions Open Rift; 
Work Rules at Issue; Seattle Remains Tense, WASH. POST, Dec. 3,1999, at A30. 
32. On June 18, 1998, the International Labor Organization adopted the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which declared that all members have an 
obligation arising from the fact of membership in the Organization to respect, and to promote 
the fundamental rights, namely: (a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; (c) 
the effective abolition of child labor; and, (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation. The text of the declaration is available at http://www.ilo.org/public/ 
english/standards/decl/declaration/text/index.htm. 
33. E.g., Stephan J. Kobrin, The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 
1998, at 97-109; Lance Compa, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and International 
Labor Rights: A Failed Connection. 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 683 (1998). 
34. E.g., Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Promoting International Respect for Workers Rights 
Through Business Codes of Conduct, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1993); Lance Compa & Tashia 
Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing International Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of 
Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663 (1995). Several corporations have also published 
their codes of conduct online. See, e.g., http://www.codagroup.net/rhr/standards.html (Reebok); 
http://www.nikebiz.com/labor/code.shtml (Nike); http://www.levistrauss.com/responsibility/ 
conduct (Levi's); http://www.gapinc.com/social_resp/ sourcing/vendorcode.htm (The Gap). 
35. Further information on these organizations is available at their respective web-sites. 
E.g., Fair Labor Association, at http://www.fairlabor.org; Worker Rights Consortium, at 
http://www.workersrights.org; Ethical Trade Initiative, at http://www.ethicaltrade.org; SA8000, at 
http://www.cepaa.org; and, the Maquila Solidarity Network, at http://www. maquilasolidarity.org. 
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In many developing countries, trade unions and NGOs shared 
years of experience investigating workers' rights violations and filing 
petitions under the GSP labor rights clause. As a result, a cross-
border network of trade union and human rights activists was already 
in place to take advantage of new opportunities presented by 
corporate codes. For example, a new group arose out of the GSP 
network in Guatemala, the Commission for the Verification of Codes 
of Conduct or Coverco.36 It quickly became known as the most 
reliable respected labor rights monitoring group in Central America, 
commissioned by companies like Liz Claiborne and stakeholder 
groups like the Fair Labor Association and the Workers Rights 
Consortium to conduct investigations under their codes. In sum, a 
modest amendment in a little-known U.S. trade program promoted by 
a small group of idealistic reformers helped build a broad movement 
for workers' rights in the global trading system. 
Highlighting the GSP labor rights clause is not meant to ignore or 
underplay the importance of decades, even centuries, of efforts to link 
workers' rights and international trade. Robert Owen, Charles 
Fourier, and other social reformers took up the issue in the early 19th 
century. Later in the 19th century, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
made it the centerpiece of the first International Workingmen's 
Association. Throughout the 20th century, the ILO, the League of 
Nations, the UN, the International Trade Organization (a forerunner 
to the WTO that was never convened), and various international 
commissions have pointed to the unfairness of trade advantage based 
on workers' rights violations. However, no institution ever backed up 
the labor rights principle with concrete action to punish a labor rights 
violator until Congress passed the U.S. GSP law. 
IV. T H E GSP L A B O R RIGHTS EXPERIENCE 
Despite the availability and importance of labor rights 
amendments in other U.S. trade laws modeled on the GSP provision, 
the original GSP formulation and petitioning process have had the 
greatest impact on workers' rights and trade policy. Since adoption of 
the GSP labor rights amendment in 1984, the United States has 
conducted approximately 100 reviews on whether countries were 
taking steps to afford workers' rights to workers in those countries. 
36. Further information about Coverco, as well as its most recent report, is available at 
http://www.laborrights.org/projects/coverco/coverco2.htm. 
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Allowing for repeated reviews of the same country, 42 different 
countries have come under labor rights scrutiny in the GSP process. 
The first 15 reviews were part of a "general review" process 
mandated by the 1984 law.37 Petitions filed by labor and human rights 
groups have prompted most of the subsequent country reviews. The 
most active petitioners have been the AFL-CIO, individual unions 
such as the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of 
America (UE), International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE), the 
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), and several NGO's, 
such as the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF), the U.S. Labor 
Education in the Americas Project (U.S. LEAP), and various 
divisions of Human Rights Watch —Asia Watch, Africa Watch, and 
Americas Watch. 
Because of labor rights violations, 13 countries have been 
suspended from GSP beneficiary status.38 Additionally, 17 have been 
placed on a temporary extension with continuing review.39 Several of 
the suspended countries undertook labor reform measures to meet 
GSP requirements and thus regained GSP benefits. The continuing 
review process persuaded others to make improvements too. 
A Case Studies 
A complicated story could be told about every GSP petition and 
conditions in the country that prompted it. This article seeks to 
convey the complexity with a few key examples. The cases of Chile, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Belarus reflect 
strengths and weaknesses in the unilateral regime of labor rights trade 
linkage under U.S. law. 
1. Chile 
The smashing of Chile's democracy by the armed forces in 1973 
carried with it —not as a byproduct, but as a strategic objective—the 
destruction of the organized labor movement and the imprisonment, 
37. Initiation of General Review Under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
50 FED. REG. 6,294 (1985). 
38. In order, they are: Romania (1987), Nicaragua (1987), Paraguay (1987), Chile (1987), 
Burma (1989), Central African Republic (1989), Liberia (1990), Sudan (1991), Syria (1992), 
Mauritania (1993), Maldives (1995), Pakistan (1996), and Belarus (2000). 
39. Continuing review was applied to Benin (1990), the Dominican Republic (1990), Haiti 
(1990), Nepal (1990), Syria (1990), Bangladesh (1991), El Salvador (1992), Mauritania (1992), 
Panama (1992), Thailand (1992), Bahrain (1993), Fiji (1993), Guatemala (1993), Indonesia 
(1993), Malawi (1993), Oman (1993), Pakistan (1994), and Swaziland (1997). 
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torture, exile, and murder of thousands of union activists.40 General 
Augusto Pinochet dissolved the United Workers' Central (CUT) and 
seized its assets on the grounds that it was a subversive political body, 
not a labor organization.41 After the coup, the new military regime 
banned collective bargaining and abolished the right to strike.42 
Additionally, the right to freely associate was profoundly curtailed.43 
For example, if workers wanted to hold a meeting to discuss 
workplace issues, the date and time, place, and agenda had to be 
delivered in writing to the local police 2 days in advance. Military 
governors could remove union officials deemed "unsuitable."44 
More than a decade later, abuses against Chilean workers and 
trade unionists were still rampant. Outspoken union leaders suffered 
internal banishment to remote areas of the country. In 1982, Tucapel 
Jimenez, a leading public employee union leader, was abducted by a 
military death squad, shot twice in the head, had his throat slit open, 
and his body thrown at the side of the road. In 1985, 3 teachers' union 
leaders suffered a similar fate.45 Throughout the mid-1980s, human 
rights monitors reported hundreds of cases of abduction, torture, 
beatings, and threats against trade union activists. Moreover, under 
the 1979 Labor plan and, subsequently, the 1987 Labor Code, union 
leaders were banned from membership or activity in any political 
party.46 The Code denied workers in "seasonal" industries like 
agriculture, construction, and many natural resources sectors the right 
to organize by requiring that workers be employed for at least 6 
months.47 Obliging union dues payments was prohibited and dues 
could no longer be automatically deducted from a member's 
paycheck.48 If a union did exist, collective bargaining was limited to 
the single workplace and to a single issue—wages.49 Employers, on 
the other hand, were free to lock out employees, hire strike breakers, 
and negotiate directly with individual employees.50 
40. PAUL W. DRAKE, LABOR MOVEMENTS AND DICTATORSHIPS: T H E SOUTHERN CONE 
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 124(1996). 
41. Id. at 129. 
42. Id. at 131. See also Joseph Collins & John Lear, Working in Chile's Free Market, LATIN 
AM. PERSPS.. Winter 1995, at 10,13. 
43. Id. 
44. Military Government Decree No. 198, Dec. 10,1973 (on file with author). 
45. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/ 
V/II.66, doc. 17(1985). 
46. Collins & Lear, supra note 42, at 17-18. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 18-19. 
50. Id. at 19. 
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a. The GSP Petition 
In 1986, the AFL-CIO and the independent United Electrical, 
Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE), filed petitions under 
the GSP labor rights clause challenging Chile's beneficiary status 
because of the military government's abuses against workers.51 The 
U.S. unions worked closely with Chilean unionists and human rights 
monitors to amass the information supporting the charges of 
systematic labor right violations. Independent unions in Chile 
approved of the move. Responding to the petition, the Chilean 
government claimed to undertake "positive steps" to improve 
workers' rights, including government assurances that killing, jailing, 
and harassment of union leaders would be halted. The USTR 
continued the GSP labor review for 1 year.52 
The labor groups cited continuing outrages against workers and 
trade unionists in 1987 petitions. Military terror squads, known as the 
"armed men in civilian clothing," kidnapped, beat, and threatened 
several individual union leaders. Also, as previously mentioned, the 
supposed labor code reforms only tightened the government's grip on 
union activity and tilted bargaining power more toward employers. 
Based on the continuing violations cited in the workers' rights 
petitions, the United States suspended Chile from GSP beneficiary 
status in February 1988.53 
The GSP cutoff jolted Chilean economic and political elites. 
Business interests formerly comfortable with military rule and 
suppressed labor movements now faced economic sanctions just when 
they hoped to expand their exports to the United States. Some joined 
calls by labor, human rights, and other democratic forces for an end to 
the dictatorship and a return to more democratic rule.54 In a plebiscite 
in October 1988, the Chilean people voted to do just that, supporting 
a "No" vote when asked if they wanted General Pinochet to continue 
as the head of government.55 
It would be overstating the case to say that the GSP decision was 
the decisive element in Chile's return to civilian government. Chile's 
51. See Petition to the United States Trade Representative, Labor Rights in Chile (1986); 
Petition to the United States Trade Representative, Labor Rights in Chile (1987) (filed by the 
UE and the AFL-CIO) (on file with USTR). 
52. Actions Concerning the Generalized System of Preferences, 52 FED. REG. 389 (Jan. 6. 
1987). 
53. Amending the Generalized System of Preferences, 52 FED. REG. 49,129 (Dec. 30,1987). 
54. Paul Adams, Suspension of Generalized System of Preferences from Chile—The Proper 
Use of a Trade Provision, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 501-530 (Winter 1990). 
55. Eugene Robinson, Chile's Pinochet Beaten In Plebiscite on Rule; Voters Reject Bid for 8 
More Years in Power, WASH. POST, Oct. 6. 1988, at Al . 
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turn toward democracy was a complex process. Trade unionists and 
other democratic activists played a key part rallying a majority of their 
compatriots, through a political dynamic unique to Chile, to reject the 
dictatorship. But the U.S. GSP action should not be discounted 
either. Chile's economic elites could live with a government that was 
an international pariah politically, as long as its free-market, export-
oriented policies stayed intact and their profits kept rolling in. But 
when exports to the United States became threatened by General 
Pinochet's labor policies, business interests began softening their 
support for the dictatorship. In 1991, with a new democratically 
elected government in place, the most abusive features of the labor 
code removed, and an end to physical violence against trade union 
activists, Chile's GSP benefits were restored.56 
2. Guatemala 
The GSP labor rights experience with Guatemala was longer and 
more circuitous than Chile's story of dictatorship and suspension of 
GSP benefits followed by democracy and renewal of GSP benefits. 
The Guatemala case reflects more fully how GSP's labor rights 
amendment is viewed by successive administrations as a trade and 
foreign policy tool to this day. The United States never cut off GSP 
benefits for Guatemala, despite compelling evidence of workers' 
rights violations, perhaps even worse than those in Chile. At the same 
time, however, labor rights advocates found ways to maneuver within 
the confines of many years' "continuing review" of Guatemala's GSP 
status. 
After World War II, Guatemalan workers and trade union 
organizations enjoyed several years of advances in labor rights and 
labor conditions, alongside a reforming democratic government. An 
estimated one-fourth of the Guatemalan work force, and perhaps a 
majority of workers in regular full-time employment settings, were 
union represented. Minimum wage, health coverage and other, and 
social insurance legislation protected employees. 
Those developments ended in 1954 with a CIA-sponsored 
military takeover that eliminated Guatemala's democratically elected 
56. This does not mean there are not still severe problems with Chilean labor law and 
practice. U.S. and Chilean unionists combined to oppose Chile's accession to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement based on continued restrictions on organizing, bargaining, the 
right to strike, and other labor norms. For a thorough analysis, see Carol Pier, Labor Rights in 
Chile and NAFTA Labor Standards: Questions of Compatibility on the Eve of Free Trade, 19 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 185 (1998). 
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government. After the turn to military rule, suppression of 
organized labor became a consistent feature of Guatemalan life.58 It 
attracted less attention from the media and from the human rights 
community than the military's campaign to wipe out indigenous 
peoples and communities in the countryside, but the labor repression 
had equally profound effects on Guatemalan society. The social 
welfare net was shredded and trade unions were suppressed as 
wealthy land and business owners and their military allies tightened 
their grip on the country, its resources, and its workers.59 
Throughout the 1970s and into the mid-1980s, a harsh military 
campaign against a small guerilla movement provoked human rights 
violations on a massive scale. The main victims were the indigenous 
peoples of the Guatemalan highlands.60 More than 100,000 people 
were killed or "disappeared" by the Army during this period.61 
Highland peasants were not the only victims however. In 1980, 27 
leaders of the national trade union federation, the CNT, were 
kidnapped and disappeared.62 Two months later, the national police 
hauled away 17 other leaders from a meeting in Esquintla. Their 
bodies were never recovered.63 At the regional and local levels, 
dozens of individual union leaders were assassinated. Many more 
went into exile under death threats.64 
By the mid-1980s, international revulsion began to isolate 
Guatemala diplomatically. The military agreed to step aside, at least 
nominally, in 1986. Under the terms of a new constitution, a civilian 
government led by Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo declared 
guarantees of rights of organization and bargaining for workers.65 
Guatemalan labor activists responded with increased activity, forming 
new unions and seeking to bargain with employers.66 They were often 
frustrated, though, by continued killings, assaults and threats, lax 
enforcement of labor law, a hostile judiciary, and continued employer 
57. STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KINZER, BITTER FRUIT: T H E UNTOLD STORY OF 
THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA 28 (1982); JIM HANDY, GIFT OF THE DEVIL: HISTORY 
OF GUATEMALA (1984). 
58. SEE JAMES GOLDSTON, SHATTERED HOPE: GUATEMALAN WORKERS AND THE 
PROMISE OF DEMOCRACY 5-9 (1989). 
59. Id. 
60. AMERICAS WATCH, GUATEMALA: A NATION OF PRISONERS 104 (1984). 
61 . ID. AT 1 6 (1984) ; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: A HUMAN RIGHTS 
RECORD (1987). 
62. GOLDSTON, supra note 58, at 8. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 7-9; Anna Eisner, Guatemala Unions: Testing the Waters, NACLA REPORT ON 
THE AMERICAS, July/August 1986, at 24. 
65. GOLDSTON, sw/?nz note 58. at 11. 
66. Id. 
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resistance to unions.67 It was commonplace for trade union activists to 
be accused of links to the guerilla movement as a method of 
frightening them and their co-workers into abandoning union 
organizing.68 
The Christian Democratic administration was replaced in 1990 
elections that brought conservative businessman Jorge Serrano to the 
presidency in January 1991.69 Serrano campaigned on promises of 
economic development, especially in the maquila sector of factories 
exporting apparel and electronics goods, mostly to the United States.70 
A program that began in the mid-1980's, with just 6 factories 
employing fewer than 2,000 workers, quickly grew to more than 275 
factories and 50,000 employees by 1992.71 Fierce employer opposition 
to union organizing, massive minimum wage and hour violations, 
hazardous working conditions, and widespread use of child labor 
marked industrial relations in this sector.72 The decades-old Labor 
Code contained a series of procedural hurdles that obstructed new 
union organizing and made most strike activity illegal. Minimum 
wage and child labor laws were badly enforced.73 
Violence against trade union activists persisted, with documented 
cases of assassinations, disappearances, kidnappings, assaults, and 
threats/4 In the highlands, "Civilian Self-Defense Patrols," created by 
the military ostensibly to confront guerilla forays, instead became 
instruments of rule by intimidation. Peasants were pressed into 
service with the Patrols and subjected to forced labor building roads, 
barracks, and in some cases, vacation homes for military officers.75 On 
sugar, coffee, and banana plantations—that still dominated the 
67. Id. at 11-13 (noting that unionists continued to be persecuted); LAWYERS COMMITTEE 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ABANDONING T H E VICTIMS: T H E UN ADVISORY SERVICES PROGRAM 
IN GUATEMALA 48 (1990). 
68. GOLDSTON, supra note 58, at 12; see also, Petition to the United States Trade 
Representative: Labor Rights in Guatemala (1988); Petition to the United States Trade 
Representative: Labor Rights in Guatemala (1989); Petition and Request for Review of the 
GSP Status of Guatemala (1990); Petition and Request for Review of the GSP Status of 
Guatemala (1991) (on file with USTR). 
69. KURT PETERSEN, THE MAQUILADORA REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA 3 (1992). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 32-33. 
72. Id. at 3-4. 
73. Id. 
74. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: TRADE UNIONISTS AND POLITICAL 
ACTIVISTS TARGETED UNDER THE N E W GOVERNMENT (1991); Petitions, supra note 68. 
75. See AMERICAS WATCH, CLOSING THE SPACE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA, May 
1987-Oct. 1988, 75-81 (1988); AMERICAS WATCH, MESSENGERS OF DEATH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
GUATEMALA, Nov. 1988-Mar. 1990, 95-101 (1990); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, CRITIQUE: REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989 80 (1990); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: 
IMPUNITY—A QUESTION OF POLITICAL WILL 9-13 (1993); Petitions, supra note 68. 
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Guatemalan economy and made up the bulk of the country's exports 
to the United States—union organizing was suppressed, child labor 
was rampant, minimum wage laws were ignored, and toxic chemicals 
were used abundantly by farm workers with no warning of their 
effects and no protective clothing or devices made available.76 
a. The GSP Petition 
Beginning in 1988, the ILRF, along with a new NGO called the 
Guatemala Labor Education Project (GLEP),77 and allied U.S. union, 
church, and human rights groups filed petitions each year to the 
USTR calling for an end to GSP benefits for Guatemala unless the 
government halted labor rights violations. Separately, in its annual 
comprehensive filing covering many countries, the AFL-CIO also 
petitioned for Guatemala's GSP cutoff. 
Before each petition was filed, the ILRF-GLEP coalition sent a 
delegation to Guatemala to meet with workers, union leaders, church 
activists, U.S. embassy staff, and Guatemalan government officials. 
The delegations also met each year with agricultural and maquila 
enterprise owners, and with officials of the Guatemalan counterpart 
to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In a parallel fashion, Guatemalan 
unionists sent delegations to the United States to tour the country 
meeting with labor, church, human rights, and community 
organizations, and in Washington with U.S. government officials to 
discuss labor rights and labor conditions in Guatemala.78 
Petitioners detailed assassinations, arrests, and torture of trade 
union activists, repressive provisions of the Guatemalan Labor Code, 
and non-enforcement of worker protection laws in the first four GSP 
petitions filed by U.S. labor rights advocates from 1988 to 1991. 
However, during this initial period, the USTR denied review of every 
one.79 
USTR made 2 main arguments in refusing to accept for review 
the 1988-1991 petitions. First, evidence of trade unionists victimized 
by threats, beatings, and assassinations made a possible case for 
human rights violations, but not for labor rights violations because it 
76. Petitions, supra note 68. 
77. Later, GLEP expanded its work to include other countries and became the U.S. Labor 
Education in the Americas project (U.S. LEAP). 
78. Author Compa participated in these delegations and wrote the GSP petitions that 
followed. This account is based on his participation in Guatemala GSP work. 
79. See USTR, GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Workers Rights 
Review Summary: Petitions Not Accepted For Review (Guatemala 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991) 
(on file with USTR, US/GLEP and ILRF). 
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was not clear that they suffered such reprisals because of their trade 
union work.80 Second, the mere introduction of labor reform 
legislation, before any parliamentary approval of such reforms, 
indicated that the government was "taking steps" to afford worker 
rights.81 A more specious line of reasoning is hard to imagine. 
b. Dynamic for Change 
Despite the initial failure to achieve acceptance for review, the 
filing of petitions and their possible acceptance created a dynamic that 
modestly changed labor conditions in Guatemala. Behind the official 
rejection of the petitions, U.S. officials pressed the government of 
Guatemala for movement on labor rights to justify their rejection. 
The annual cycle of delegations and petitions put increasing 
pressure on Guatemalan government and employer interests to avoid 
scrutiny under the GSP labor rights clause and risk losing beneficiary 
status. Each year, one or more collective bargaining disputes or 
failures to grant legal status to a newly organized union, cited by 
petitioners as evidence of worker rights violations in Guatemala, were 
resolved in workers' favor just as consideration of the labor rights 
petition was getting underway. Although viewed by labor rights 
petitioners as evasive action that failed to address the overall pattern 
of worker rights violations, such moves allowed the government of 
Guatemala to claim it was "taking steps" to afford labor rights.82 
The exchange of petitions and rejections in 1988-1991 also put 
pressure on the U.S. government. The TPSC found itself having to 
devise increasingly contorted arguments to justify a refusal to accept 
Guatemala GSP petitions for review. However, a breakthrough came 
in 1992. After a new labor rights petition was submitted in June 1992, 
the ILRF, GLEP, and allied union, church, and human rights groups 
organized letter-writing campaigns from their grass roots members to 
members of Congress and to the USTR urging acceptance of the 
Guatemala petition and calling for public hearings. More than 100 




82. The source for this is author Compa's interviews with officials from the USTR in 
Washington and with U.S. embassy staff in Guatemala, who said that they were pressuring the 
government of Guatemala for change. These statements were made in off-the-record meetings 
with petitioners protesting the failure to accept petitions for review. The fact that some disputes 
got settled for no other apparent reason bore out their argument. 
83. Letters to members of Congress to Carla Hill (on file with USTR). 
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In August 1992, the U.S. Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) 
finally accepted a Guatemala labor rights petition for review.84 In 
October, the TPSC held a public hearing on conditions for workers 
and unions in Guatemala. If the TPSC found Guatemala in violation 
of the labor rights' conditionality clause in GSP, a decision to apply 
sanctions could be announced in April 1993, to take effect in July 
1993. As it turned out, these dates were critical in subsequent events. 
Like earlier petitions, the 1992 Guatemala complaint pointed to 
repeated attacks and threats against trade unionists, labor code 
provisions that violated ILO Conventions, illegal crushing of efforts 
by workers to form unions, failure to enforce minimum wage and hour 
laws, extensive child labor, and abusive health and safety hazards.85 A 
focus of the petition was conditions in the rapidly growing maquila 
sector, especially in the large number of garment assembly plants 
owned by Korean investors.86 
The U.S. government's acceptance of the 1992 petition caused 
consternation in Guatemala. Government, business, and the media 
joined ranks to denounce U.S. interference in the sovereign affairs of 
Guatemala.87 More ominously, new death threats were made against 
Guatemalan union leaders who hosted U.S. labor rights delegations 
and who came to Washington to testify at the GSP hearing.88 Still, 
Guatemala was anxious to avoid sanctions. The government and 
employers moved quickly to settle a number of long-standing labor 
disputes and to amend the Labor Code with provisions long sought by 
84. Review of Product and Country Practice Petitions, 57 FED. REG. 38,088 (Aug. 21,1992). 
85. The 1992 GSP Labor Rights in Guatemala petition was filed by the International Labor 
Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF, now ILRF), US/GLEP, the United Electrical, 
Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union (ACTWU), the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), the United 
Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), the International Union of Food and Allied Workers' 
Associations (IUF), the International Union of Electronics Workers (IUE), the Washington 
Office on Latin America (WOLA), and the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the 
U.S.A., Human Rights Office. Another GSP labor rights petition on Guatemala was filed 
separately by the AFL-CIO (both on file with USTR). 
86. Fifty of the largest factories in the maquila sector are owned by Korean investors. 
Promoters of export-led development in Guatemala saw the Korean "economic miracle" of the 
1960s and 70s as a model for Guatemala. PETERSEN, supra note 69, at 137. 
87. ILRF and US/LEAP have extensive news clips on file. Typical is the following from an 
editorial in E L GRAFICO, June 16, 1992 (on file with author): "Eso es lo absurdo de los 
norteamericanos cuando meten sus narices en los asuntos internos de otros pueblos... Si hay un 
pueblo que ha sido a lo largo de su historia violador de los derechos humanos, ha sido los Estados 
Unidos" (This is the absurdity of the Americans when they stick their nose into the internal 
affairs of other peoples . . . If there is one people that has been throughout its history a violator 
of human rights, it has been the United States"). 
88. Interview with Rodolfo Robles, IUF Regional Secretary, Guatemala City (Nov. 1992). 
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trade unions. Union organizing was simplified under the reforms and 
enforcement measures were strengthened.89 
After acceptance for review and the public hearings that 
followed, there were 3 possible outcomes to the administrative 
process under the GSP labor rights clause. Guatemala could be found 
to be "taking steps" to afford internationally recognized worker rights 
and thus remain eligible for GSP benefits. It could be found not to be 
taking steps and suffer the sanction of removal from GSP beneficiary 
status. Or Guatemala could be placed on what USTR calls 
"continuing review" status, where it would remain in the GSP 
program with careful monitoring of steps to improve labor rights and 
working conditions. Without such improvements, sanctions might 
swiftly be applied. ^ 
Initially, petitioners objected to the "continuing review" option, 
arguing it was not contemplated or permitted under the statute. But 
practical considerations breached this principled position. For one 
thing, there was progress in several prominent labor disputes. Unions 
whose applications for "legal personality" (a status needed to buy 
property, employ staff, and make contracts) had been delayed for 
months, suddenly found themselves certified and able to function. 
Some stubborn collective bargaining conflicts were settled with gains 
for workers. 
Just as important, death threats against Guatemalan union 
activists had to be taken seriously. Demanding immediate imposition 
of a cutoff of GSP benefits against Guatemala might endanger the 
lives of trade unionists who worked closely with U.S. petitioners. 
With these realities in mind, the petitioners and the Guatemalan 
unionists in March 1993, agreed to drop demands for sanctions and 
instead called for a "continuing review." 
89. E.g., U.S. State Department Cable, U.S. Embassy Guatemala, Labor Code 
Amendments: A Review and Analysis (Dec. 22, 1992) (on file with US/GLEP and ILRF); 
Bulletin, Department of International Affairs, AFL-CIO, Guatemala: Labor Code Meets First 
Test (Feb. 1993) (on file with author). 
90. In another context, the ILRF objected to the "continuing review" option, arguing it was 
not contemplated or permitted under the statute. In fact, the ILRF and every other labor and 
human rights organization that had ever filed a GSP petition sued the Bush administration for 
failure to apply the labor rights amendment as intended by Congress. Plaintiffs in International 
Labor Rights Ed. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992) argued that the 
statute only allowed a finding of compliance, in which case beneficiary status is maintained, or 
violation, in which case the violator is removed from the program. A divided 3-judge appeals 
panel upheld a motion to dismiss, but on conflicting grounds. 
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c. Constitutional Crisis 
A dramatic turn of events in Guatemala soon afterwards made 
the GSP labor rights petition a pivotal issue for the future of 
constitutional order in Guatemala. On May 25,1993, President Jorge 
Serrano dissolved the Guatemalan parliament and Supreme Court, 
and suspended constitutional rights.91 He warned against 
"destabilizing" protest activity by trade unionists and grassroots 
organizations. 
Union leaders and other activists in farm worker and community 
organizations went underground, fearing a revival of mass arrests, 
killings, and disappearances. As one analyst put it: "Union leaders 
are cautious. They want to gauge how much international sympathy 
(and thus some measure of protection) there is for direct action 
against Serrano. 'We're not all meeting together, and we're staying in 
different locations,' says Dino Arana of the Union of Guatemalan 
Workers."92 
The impending decision on Guatemala's GSP status proved to be 
a critically important policy tool for the United States in pressing for 
the restoration of constitutional governance. At news of the 
autogolpe (self-coup), the U.S. labor rights coalition met with USTR 
and State Department officials demanding an immediate cutoff of 
Guatemala's GSP benefits unless constitutional rule was restored. 
The State Department issued a statement that "unless democracy is 
restored in Guatemala, GSP benefits are likely to be withdrawn."93 
U.S. press analysis pointed out the leverage in the GSP decision: 
"But perhaps more damaging to the local economy and Mr. Serrano's 
cause could be the call by U.S. labor rights groups to revoke 
Guatemalan industry's tariff-free access to the U.S. market for certain 
p roduc t s . . . . Guatemala's labor practices are already under review 
by the U.S. Trade Representative's off ice . . . . Given Serrano's 
suspension of the right of public protest and strikes, analysts expect 
U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to consider terminating 
Guatemala's trade benefits."94 The New York Times also cited the 
impending labor rights decision as critical to Serrano's fate. It 
91. Tod Robberson, Guatemalan President Seizes Decree Power, Dissolves Congress; Moves 
Follow Talk of Restive Military, WASH. POST, May 26, 1993, at A21. 
92. David Clark Scott, Guatemalans and U.S. Put Pressure on President to Restore 
Democracy: Labor, Political and Religious Groups Mount Protests as U.S. Places Aid and Trade 
Benefits Under Review, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 28, 1993, at 7. 
93. Jared Kotler, Keep the Economic Heat on Guatemala's Leaders, MIAMI HERALD, June 
7.1993.atllA. 
94. Id. 
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reported on the day before his abdication that "businessmen have 
panicked at a threat by the United States to withdraw Guatemala's 
trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences."95 
Serrano's autogolpe collapsed. On June 5, the reconvened 
Guatemalan Congress elected Ramiro Deleon Carpio, who had been 
the independent human rights special counsel and a leading human 
rights advocate in Guatemala, as the new president of the country.96 
The following day, after Serrano's flight into exile, a New York Times 
analysis concluded: 
Why Mr. Serrano launched his palace coup in the first place . . . 
was never entirely clear. But the reasons for his downfall were 
clearer. Most important, it seems, was the concern of business 
leaders that Guatemala's rising exports to the United States and 
Europe could be devastated if threatened sanctions were imposed. 
Within hours of an American threat to cut Guatemala's trade 
benefits, business leaders who in the past had supported 
authoritarian rule began pressing government and military officials 
to reverse Mr. Serrano's action.9 
On June 25, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor 
announced that Guatemala would remain a GSP beneficiary country 
for an extended "continuing review" period. "If countries fail to 
make substantial concrete progress in addressing worker rights 
concerns during this time," he warned, "their GSP benefits will be in 
serious jeopardy."98 
Even more than in Chile, the GSP labor rights petition was a 
powerful policy instrument available at just the right time to affect on 
the course of events in Guatemala and get it back on track toward 
constitutional government. The results demonstrate the potency of 
international labor rights advocacy where national and regional 
economies are increasingly interconnected. 
d. Continuing Review 
For several years after the 1993 constitutional crisis, Guatemala 
remained on "continuing review" status for GSP eligibility. The GSP 
labor rights case was not as prominent as United Nations-sponsored 
95. Tim Golden, Guatemalan Leader Is Pressed to Yield Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 1. 1993. 
atA7. 
96. Tod Robberson, Guatemala Swears in New President, Rights Leader Faces Political 
Challenges, WASH. POST, June 7, 1993, at A13. 
97. Tim Golden, Guatemala's Counter-Coup: A Military About-Face, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 
1993, at A3. 
98. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative Kantor Announces Results of 1992 GSP 
Reviews (June 25,1993). 
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negotiations for a political settlement to end the civil war, but it still 
got results in specific cases as labor rights advocates prodded for 
change. With these gains in place and with progress in implementing 
the United Nations-brokered peace accord, U.S. labor rights 
advocates in 1997 quietly approved the U.S. government's decision to 
halt the continuing review of Guatemala's GSP status and to maintain 
its full normal GSP benefits." 
Lobbying by the AFL-CIO and by US/LEAP, and other labor 
rights advocates, persuaded the Clinton administration's USTR to 
reopen a GSP labor rights review of Guatemala's beneficiary status in 
2000. Fragile labor courts and enforcement institutions had failed to 
anchor reforms and employers who still saw trade unions as 
subversive bodies launched new attacks on workers. Armed bands 
assaulted leaders of a banana plantation workers' union at a 
DelMonte company subsidiary in late 1999, and many union members 
were fired. Evidence continued to pour out of maquila factories of 
harsh conditions, sexual harassment, short pay, excessive hours, child 
labor, and other labor rights abuses. 
In May 2001, the Bush administration closed the review and kept 
Guatemala in the GSP program.100 The decision was a disappointment 
for Guatemalan unionists and their supporters in the United States 
because the pressure of the GSP process seemed to be an important 
means of achieving results for workers. Bush's USTR pointed to the 
reinstatement of banana plantation workers and the first of its kind 
prosecution and conviction of the assailants who had beaten their 
union leaders.101 The USTR also cited a labor reform bill approved by 
the Guatemala Congress in 2001 that granted new rights to farm 
workers and stronger penalties against violators.102 All this, said the 
USTR, was evidence that Guatemala was "taking steps" in 
compliance with GSP labor requirements. 
The USTR's "taking steps" maneuvering with Guatemala under 
the GSP labor rights clause is a telling example of both potential and 
limits for advancing workers' rights through trade-linked measures. 
Disappointments are many and Guatemala workers still face 
enormous obstacles. But the dynamic of recourse to the GSP 
mechanism and its "stick" of threatened sanctions, and "carrot" of 
99. USTR Begins Worker Rights Review For Belarus, Swaziland; Ends Guatemala, DAILY 
LAB. REP. (BNA), May 6,1997, at D-18. 
100. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Concludes Review of Guatemala's 
Labor Practices and Trade Preferences Under U.S. Law (May 31, 2001). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
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continued beneficiary status, combined with deep sustained cross-
border coordination and solidarity among trade unions and human 
rights organizations in Guatemala and the United States have 
dramatically altered the nature and course of workers' struggles. 
3. Malaysia and Indonesia 
A positive balance can be discerned in efforts by the U.S. 
government to apply the GSP labor rights clause in Chile or 
Guatemala. The cases of Malaysia and Indonesia are less 
encouraging. They reflect a more cynical use of the labor rights 
clause, allowing economic interests to prevail against human rights 
considerations. 
Independent trade unions played important roles in Malaysian 
and Indonesian independence movements against British and Dutch 
colonialists after the Second World War. They were also important 
actors in the early years of independence. As military-dominated 
ruling groups consolidated power in the 1960s, however, independent 
labor unions were crushed and official government-sponsored unions 
took their place. Labor repression was especially fierce in Indonesia. 
Thousands of union leaders and members were among the half-
million murdered victims of the new regime of General Suharto.103 
Both countries became exemplars of the Asian economic model, 
suppressing democratic freedoms and labor rights to foster an 
investment and export climate favorable to multinational corporations 
from the United States, Japan, and other developed countries. 
Malaysia became a center for electronics manufacturing, with tens of 
thousands of workers laboring in special export processing zones for 
United States firms like Motorola, General Instrument, and Harris 
Electronics.104 Indonesia's vast natural resources like oil, gas, tin, 
bauxite, nickel, gold, and timber also attracted billions of dollars in 
Western investment. More recently, Indonesia has become a main 
subcontracting source for the international running shoe industry with 
hundreds of thousands of workers turning out goods for Nike, 
Reebok, Adidas, and other United States and European companies.105 
103. For a thorough discussion of the Suharto coup and the subsequent state-sponsored 
massacres of communists and other dissidents, see GEOFF SIMONS, INDONESIA, THE LONG 
OPPRESSION Ch. 5 (2000). 
104. MARVIN LEVINE, WORKER RIGHTS AND LABOR STANDARDS IN ASIA'S FOUR NEW 
TIGERS 333 (1997). 
105. E.g., Robert Collier, U.S. Firms Reducing Sweatshop Abuses; But Wages Still at Poverty 
Level, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 17, 1999, at Al . 
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Malaysian and Indonesian leaders became leading proponents of 
what they claimed to be "Asian values," like labor discipline, social 
conformity, and deference to authority, counterposed to Western-
inspired concepts like individual rights, free speech, and independent 
union formation.106 Throughout the 1980s and 90s, Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamed regularly denounced labor rights 
advocacy as part of a Western plot to retard economic development.107 
In Indonesia, an elaborate corporatist ideology called Pancasila 
purported to harmonize society under state guidance.108 
Behind the rhetoric of non-confrontation and harmony lay state-
led violence and repression against workers in Malaysia and 
Indonesia. In Malaysia, only government-sponsored unions were 
permitted to exist in the electronics sector and bargaining was limited 
to the enterprise rather than the industry.109 This effectively nullified 
any potential bargaining power for workers. Additionally, U.S.-based 
electronics companies insisted that the government ban independent 
freely chosen unions and sector-wide collective bargaining in the 
growing electronics industry. Indeed, the companies openly 
threatened to leave Malaysia if the ban on genuine unions and 
industry-wide bargaining was lifted.110 
In Indonesia, Pancasila was really a labor control mechanism.111 
Companies in Indonesia maintained high numbers of security guards 
roaming workplace floors for strict surveillance and suppression of 
any workers' movement to challenge management's unilateral 
power.112 Behind them, the military stepped in to forcibly break 
strikes or any protest movement to demand higher wages and better 
106. See Mark Magnier, ASEAN Nations Lash Out at West For Tying Human Rights to 
Trade, J. OF COM., July 23, 1991, at 1; William Branigin, Asians Question America's Moral 
Authority to Lecture on Rights, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1994, at A33. For more on Mahathir 
Mohamed's "Look East'1 policy, see JOMO KWAME SUNDARAM & PATRICIA TODD, TRADE 
UNIONS AND THE STATE IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA 150-151 (1994); ANTHONY WOODIWISS, 
GLOBALIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR LAW IN PACIFIC ASIA 212-213 (1998). 
107. LEV1NE, supra note 104, at 331. 
108. VEDI HADIZ, WORKERS AND THE STATE IN N E W ORDER INDONESIA 84-110 (1997). 
109. SUNDARAM & TODD, supra note 106, at 153-156. 
110. See A. Wangel, The ILO and Protection of Trade Union Rights: The Electronics 
Industry in Malaysia, in TRADE UNIONS AND THE NEW INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE THIRD 
WORLD (R. Southall ed., 1988); J. Kankiah, National Union's Out, Electronics Workers Can 
Only Form In-House Unions, KUALA LUMPUR STAR, Oct. 20, 1988 (on file with author); 
Memorandum of General Instruments Corp., Nov. 4, 1986, "If there is a union of any kind . . . it 
may mean closing down the plant in Malaysia," cited in ILRF's 1990 petition to the USTR. 
111. HADIZ, supra, note 108, at 84-110. 
112. Id. at 104-109. 
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working conditions.113 Workers had to obtain police approval for any 
meeting of more than 5 persons away from the workplace. 
In some cases, torture and murder were employed as instruments 
of labor discipline. For example, in May 1993, a 24-year-old woman 
worker named Marsinah was tortured and murdered after leading a 
strike action at a watch factory in East Java.114 A 22-year-old worker 
named Rush was beaten and left to drown in a river in March 1994, 
during a strike in Medan.115 The following month, the body of a 23-
year-old woman worker, Titi Sugiarti, was found floating in a waste 
pond with evidence of beating and torture near the shoe factory where 
she worked, after leading protest demonstrations for better maternity 
benefits.116 In April 1995, the ILO accused the Indonesian regime of 
murder and the abuse of trade unionist, and demanded that the 
government find and punish those involved.117 
a. GSP Petitions 
In 1987 and 1988, the AFL-CIO, the ILRF, Asia Watch, and 
other advocacy groups began filing GSP labor rights petitions on 
Malaysia and Indonesia. The petitions detailed many abuses like 
those just mentioned. However, successive Reagan, Bush, and 
Clinton administrations failed to act upon the evidence of systematic 
labor rights violations in those countries. In a decision announced in 
1989, the USTR brazenly found Malaysia to be "taking steps" in line 
with the law at the same time that Trade Representative Carla Hills 
wrote to the Malaysian Minister of Trade and Finance that "your 
government does not allow full freedom for workers to associate and 
form the labor organizations of their own choosing in certain export 
industries such as the electronics industry . . . [Y]our government's 
113. Id.; Margot Cohen, Indonesians Push for Labor Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Sept. 1, 1992, at 5 (The director general of Industrial Relations and Labor Standards at 
Indonesia's Ministry of Manpower acknowledged that the military is often used to break up 
strikes at the request of factory owners, stating "It is the duty of the military to come down right 
away if there is an invitation."). 
114. Marsilah's torture included mutilation to make it appear a crime of rape. Later, 
company supervisors and local security officials were arrested and convicted of the crime. 
However, many analysts believe these arrests and trial were part of a large cover-up of 
involvement by higher-level security forces. See Asia Watch Newsletter, Indonesia: New 
Developments on Labor Rights, Vol. 6, No. 1, Jan. 24, 1994. See also, Who Killed Marsinah?, 
ASIAWEEK, Mar. 23, 1994, at 28-31; Goenawan Mohamad, In Rural Java, Death Comes to a 
Fighter and a Dreamer, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 13, 1994, at 7. 
115. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 103, at 32-3. 
116. Sugiarti's death was acknowledged by U.S. Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard at the 
Indonesian Women Workers Conference, Jakarta, Oct. 20, 2000. The full text of his speech is 
available at http://www.nikeworkers.org. 
117. LEVINE, supra note 104, at 210. 
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Pioneer Industries Program restricts some collective bargaining. . . at 
firms with foreign investment."118 
The AFL-CIO and the Labor Rights Fund filed new petitions in 
1990, citing the continued ban on independent unions and collective 
bargaining in the electronics export processing zones (EPZs), pointing 
to Hills' letter as evidence. The USTR refused to accept the petition 
on the grounds that it contained "no new information," distinguishing 
it from the earlier one.119 
The United States never began a labor rights review in Malaysia. 
In Indonesia, though, the USTR started a review in the face of 
mounting evidence of severe labor rights violations cited by the U.S. 
State Department's annual Human Rights Report, as well as by GSP 
petitioners in 1992.120 The announcement of an Indonesia labor rights 
review created a furor in that country and in U.S. investment circles. 
This was not Guatemala, with a population of 6 million people and a 
meager economy sending coffee, sugar, and 99-cent underpants to the 
U.S. market. It was a country of 120 million people with oil, gold, and 
$125.00 Nike sneakers to export. Additionally, almost 15% of its 
exports to the United States entered duty free in 1992 under the GSP 
program.121 
The Indonesian government recognized the importance of 
polishing its tarnished reputation and introduced several limited 
measures to give an appearance of "taking steps."122 It changed the 
labor code to give a narrow opening for non-governmental unions to 
operate.123 It reduced the national army's role in labor surveillance 
(while keeping regional and local security forces). It introduced a 
higher minimum wage.124 And most often cited in the continuing GSP 
review, it invited an ILO team to discuss labor conditions and advise 
the government on further moves.125 
118. Letter from Carla Hills (on file with ILRF and USTR). 
119. Decision of Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Case No. 005-CP-90 (on file with 
ILRF and USTR). 
120. Review of Product and Country Practice Petitions, 57 FED. REG. 38,088 (Aug. 21, 1992); 
see also, Cohen, supra note 113. 
121. HADIZ , swpra note 108, at 161. 
122. Indeed, Minister of Manpower, Cosmas Batubara, remarked in 1992, that "If Indonesia 
wants to take part in globalisation we have to respect international labor standards, such as the 
right to organize, the right to bargain. If we do not follow international labor standards, our 
commodities will be blocked." Id. 
123. Id. at 159-60, 163-4. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 167. 
HeinOnline -- 22 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 225 2000-2001 
226 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 22:199 
The heaviest weight against USTR's labor rights review of 
Indonesia came not from Indonesia, but from U.S. business.126 The 
U.S.-ASEAN Council for Business and Technology, amalgams of the 
largest U.S. multinational corporations with interests in Indonesia, 
swung into action. Mobil, Texaco, Chevron, American Express, 
General Electric, General Motors, Nynex, Caterpillar, and other big 
investors demanded an end to the GSP labor rights review because, 
according to the U.S.-ASEAN Council, "a removal of G S P . . . will 
undermine U.S. business and U.S. government interests and 
credibility." Characterizing the miniscule Indonesian moves as 
"unprecedented for their breadth and scope," the council praised the 
dictator Suharto as a "reasoned voice" in Asian affairs and called the 
country "one of the East Asian Miracles." Then it got to the point. 
Indonesia has "plentiful energy resources, significant mineral deposits, 
large timber potential, and a well-developed system of agricultural 
commodity production and exports." In the next decade, the U.S. 
companies argued, exports to Indonesia would boom in aerospace, 
electric power, telecommunications, transportation, and construction 
and mining equipment.127 
One company in particular was especially concerned over labor 
rights. Freeport McMoran, a Louisiana-based mining firm, had called 
on the Indonesian military to break strikes or labor protests in its 
operations there. Its executives joined James Riady of the Lippo 
group, an Indonesian conglomerate that funneled huge sums in illegal 
campaign contributions to the Democratic National Committee in 
1994, on the board of directors of the Indonesia Society.128 The 
Society was formed to press for an end to the GSP labor rights 
129 
review. 
126. The Indonesian government also recognized that it needed to develop strong relations 
with U.S. corporations to defeat GSP review. The Indonesian Directorate of International 
Trade stated in 1993: 
The Indonesian attitude toward the lifting of the GSP cannot be the same as our 
attitude toward Dutch aid, because the U.S. has more leverage, for example . . . in 
the form of OPIC insurance for its investment . . . We don't have the means to 
retaliate. We must therefore continue to take advantage of the dialogue with the 
U.S. although the diplomatic scope has its limits. Thus we must continue to explain 
to the U.S. team the steps we are taking toward meeting ILO standards while 
considering Indonesia's condition. In addition, we should also continue to improve 
our lobby in the U.S. by making use of Indonesia's friends, including large U.S. 
corporations that have mutually advantageous relations with Indonesia. 
Id. at 166. 
127. See U.S.-ASEAN Council for Business and Technology, Inc., Position Paper on GSP 
Benefits for Indonesia (1994) (on file with ILRF and USTR). 
128. See Tim Shorrock, U.S. Firms Influence Policy on Indonesia; Foreign Contributors 
Called Secondary Players, THE J. O F C O M . , Nov. 26, 1996, at 1 A. 
129. Id. No hard evidence has surfaced to confirm that the Lippo Group's illegal campaign 
contributions bought an end to the GSP labor rights review. Pressure from big U.S. 
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Indonesia was targeted by the Clinton administration not for 
labor rights reform, but as a "big emerging market" selected for big-
ticket trade and investment projects. Commerce Secretary Ron 
Brown and other administration officials pushed for new U.S. deals in 
Indonesia throughout 1993. In February 1994, U.S. Trade 
Representative Mickey Kantor announced an end to the labor rights 
review shortly before President Clinton paid a state visit to Indonesia 
for a meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group 
(APEC) in November.130 The decision came one week after the arrest 
of 19 Indonesian trade union leaders for publicly criticizing the 
weakness of labor reforms responding to the GSP review. The leader 
of the country's main independent labor federation, Muchtar 
Pakpahan was arrested and tried for treason.131 He faced the death 
penalty before an international outcry led to his being sentenced to 7 
years in prison instead. Muchtar was later released from prison after 
General Suharto yielded power in the turmoil of the 1998 financial 
* * 132 
crisis. 
Labor unrest in Indonesia increased in 1994, due in part to the 
termination of GSP review. The decision by the United States was 
widely perceived by the government as a capitulation. Thereafter, the 
Indonesian government became confident that GSP review would 
never materialize and consequently became more aggressive in 
confronting international criticism of its labor rights record.133 Some 
officials rejected outright the linkage between GSP's trade 
preferences and labor rights protection.134 Indeed, it was not long 
before the government retreated from its limited reforms and 
returned to the use of state repression and fear as a means of labor 
discipline. The violent state reaction to the Medan protests of April 
1994 was seen as a turning point in government policy.135 
multinational corporations with billions of dollars at stake in Indonesia was probably more 
influential in an administration where Ron Brown's deal-making trumped Robert Reich's 
concern for workers' rights. For a candid description of the relative weight of commercial versus 
labor interests in the Clinton administration, see ROBERT REICH, LOCKED IN THE CABINET 
(1997). 
130. See also Charles Wallace, Indonesian Labor Leader Gets 3-Year Prison Term; Asia: 
Official Allegedly Incited Worker Violence; Clinton To Discuss Human Rights On Upcoming 
Visit, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,1994, at A4. 
131. See, e.g., DAN LA BOTZ, MADE IN INDONESIA, INDONESIAN WORKERS SINCE 
SUHARTO 199-203 (2001); Manuel Saragosa, Indonesia Spurns U.S Pressure Over Workers 
Rights, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 15,1994, at 4. 
132. LA BOTZ, id. at 202-3; Press Release, International Labor Organization, Indonesia 
Releases Detained Trade Unionists, available at http://www.ilo.org. 
133. HADIZ, supra note 108. at 170. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
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In Chile and Guatemala, workers' rights advocates could point to 
positive results by creatively using the "taking steps" formulation and 
the "continuing review" process in applying the GSP labor rights 
clause. Malaysia and Indonesia, however, exposed the downside of 
the law's flexibility. U.S. administrations under both Republican and 
Democratic presidents gave priority to corporate economic interests 
in the face of overwhelming evidence of workers' rights violations. 
b. Recent Developments 
Labor and human rights groups have continued to file petitions to 
review labor practices under the GSP. Many recent petitions have 
been targeted at perennial problem countries, while others have been 
filed against certain of the Newly Independent States, including 
Ukraine and Belarus, and African nations such as Swaziland. The 
Belarus petition, filed by the AFL-CIO in 1997, even produced 
results; the USTR suspended benefits to Belarus in 2000, for its failure 
to uphold the right of workers to form independent unions and to 
strike.136 
Perhaps the most remarkable development is the impending (as 
this is written) reinstatement of GSP benefits to Pakistan, a decision 
strongly questioned by the AFL-CIO.137 While the reasons for the 
planned reinstatement are not yet publicly known, it is the opinion of 
many that reinstatement would not be forthcoming at this moment 
were it not for Pakistan's role in providing support to the United 
States' military campaign in Afghanistan.138 The cases of Pakistan and 
Belarus provide further evidence that the suspension of trade 
preferences for failure to observe internationally recognized workers' 
rights is influenced more by political and economic factors than 
genuine concern for labor rights. 
4. Pakistan 
The issue of child labor moved to the forefront in the 90's as 
human rights groups took note of a 12-year-old former bonded 
laborer from Pakistan named Iqbal Masih. As a child, Iqbal spent his 
days chained to a loom, where he worked 14-hour days, 6 days a week. 
However, by the time he reached his twelfth birthday, he had become 
136. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Recommends GSP Suspension of 
Belarus (July 3, 2000). 
137. Interview with Ann Knipper, International Affairs Dept., AFL-CIO (Jan. 2002). 
138. Id.; Interview with Terry Collingsworth, Executive Director, ILRF (Jan. 2002). 
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an internationally recognized advocate for children's rights and had 
campaigned to free over 3,000 children from bonded labor. His 
murder on April 16, 1995, shocked and outraged the international 
community. Shortly after his funeral, several thousand protesters, 
many of them children, marched through the streets of Lahore 
demanding an end to child labor. Western consumers reacted and the 
sale of imported carpets fell steeply. Collectively, importers in the 
United States and Europe canceled carpet orders valued at $10 
million following his death.139 
By October 1993, the Clinton administration had initiated a 
review of labor rights practices in Pakistan.140 In particular, the USTR 
cited concerns about the exemption of the Karachi Export Processing 
Zone from the labor law, the application of the Essential Services Act, 
which curtailed the right of state employees to strike or to quit, and 
the well-known and pervasive problem of child and bonded labor.141 
The administration's review continued through 1994 and 1995, while 
the United States and Pakistan engaged in a dialogue over these 
concerns. However, because the dialogue failed to bring about 
sufficient changes, particularly with regard to the use of child labor, 
President Clinton suspended GSP benefits on selected goods, 
including sporting goods, surgical instruments, and hand woven rugs 
in October 1996.142 
Despite the suspension of GSP benefits, child labor persisted in 
Pakistan. The issue of child labor in the textile and soccer ball 
industry became the focus of several campaigns by labor, consumer, 
and human rights organizations in the late 1990s. Indeed, the plight of 
Pakistani children motivated several children around the world to 
take up their cause, including Canadian Craig Kielberger, the then 13-
year old founder of Free the Children.143 The sporting goods industry 
followed the lead in 1997, pledging not to sell soccer balls made by 
child labor.144 Administered by ILO's International Program on the 
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), the child labor monitoring 
program had the ambitious, yet unsuccessful aim of eliminating child 
139. Jonathan Silver, Child Labor in Pakistan, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1996, at 79. 
140. Notice of Review of Product and Country Practice Petitions, 58 FED. REG. 53,959 (Oct. 
19, 1993). 
141. Notice of Suspension of Certain Pakistan GSP Benefits, 60 FED. REG. 56,088 (Nov. 6, 
1995). 
142. Id.; Amendment to the Generalized System of Preferences, 61 FED. REG. 54,719 (Oct. 
21,1996). 
143. Steven Greenhouse, Child Labor Issue Ignites a Multifaceted Youthful Crusade, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 25,1996, at Bl. 
144. Steven Greenhouse, Sporting Good Concerns Agree to Combat Sale of Soccer Balls 
Made by Children, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at A12. 
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labor from the soccer ball industry in Pakistan within 18 months. 
Also that year, Congress enacted its first ban on the import of goods 
produced by forced or indentured child labor, inserted into the 
Treasury-Postal Appropriations Bill. The bill's sponsors, including 
Rep. Bernard Sanders, hoped that the bill would affect the 
importation of rugs and carpets produced in Pakistan. "Consumers in 
the United States of America shouldn't be purchasing goods made by 
children who are indentured servants and virtual slaves. We should 
not do business this way, and we should not be perpetuating this 
system."146 
Today, the observation of labor rights in Pakistan continues to 
fall short of international labor standards. According to the 2001 
report by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor, "child labor is common and results from a 
combination of severe poverty, employer greed, and inadequate 
enforcement of laws intended to control i t . . . . The Government (of 
Pakistan) acknowledges that child labor is a problem."147 While there 
have been several advances in the fight against child labor in Pakistan, 
due to international pressure, the report notes the continued use of 
child labor in several industries, including agriculture, domestic work, 
surgical instrument manufacture, brick-making, carpet-making, and 
sporting goods manufacturing. 
Child labor is not the only labor rights issue of concern in 
Pakistan. Country reviews issued by the State Department, the ILO, 
and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
have identified continuing violations of the freedom of association, 
the right to organize and bargain collectively, and of forced and 
bonded labor, both de jure and de facto.14* The labor code prohibits 
several categories of workers from joining a union, including teachers, 
145. For a critique of the monitoring program, see INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FUND, 
CHILD LABOR IN THE SOCCER BALL INDUSTRY, A REPORT ON CONTINUED USE OF CHILD 
LABOR IN THE SOCCER BALL INDUSTRY IN PAKISTAN (1999), available at 
http://www.laborrights.org. The report highlighted the continued use of child labor in the soccer 
ball industry and the failure to provide children with educational opportunities. 
146. Steven Greenhouse, Measure to Ban Import Items Made by Children in Bondage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1,1997, at Al . 
147. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2321 
(2001). The U.S. State Department repeated this observation in its most recent report on 
Pakistan. U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 
2001 (2002), at http://www.state.gov. 
148. SEE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE T R A D E UNIONS, ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
VIOLATIONS OF T R A D E UNION RIGHTS—PAKISTAN (2001); INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION 
OF FREE T RADE UNIONS, REPORT FOR THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL REVIEW OF TRADE— 
PAKISTAN (2001); INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, INDIVIDUAL OBSERVATIONS OF 
THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS—PAKISTAN (2001); STATE DEPARTMENT, id. 
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radio, television, railway, forestry, hospital, banking, and other 
Government employees. Attempts to form independent unions are 
also often suppressed. Both the ILO and ICFTU have also expressed 
concern about the practice of artificial promotions into management 
that denies workers the right to join a union. 
Restrictions on strikes are severe and workers can be jailed for 
violations. Bricks and hand-woven wool carpets continue to be 
produced with forced or indentured child labor. Illegal bonded labor 
is pervasive in the brick, glass, fishing, and export carpet industry. 
Despite persistent labor rights violations in Pakistan, the USTR 
has signaled its intention to lift the suspension of GSP benefits to 
Pakistan.149 Indeed, legislation has already been introduced to reduce 
trade barriers and extend certain trade benefits to Pakistan in return 
for its continued support for the U.S. war in Afghanistan.150 The 
USTR has to date denied any connection between the war and the 
decision to extend benefits to Pakistan.151 Many observers believe, 
however, that the decision to reinstate GSP benefits would not have 
occurred without Pakistan's strong support for the American military 
campaign.152 While it is acknowledged that Pakistan has made gains in 
labor rights enforcement, some, such as the AFL-CIO, do not believe 
that such gains yet warrant reinstatement of GSP benefits.153 It 
appears that geopolitical concerns may once again influence GSP 
policy rather than the state of labor rights compliance. 
5. Belarus 
The United States extended GSP benefits to the central and 
eastern European states in the early 1990's, after these countries 
began the difficult transition from state to market capitalism.154 The 
extension of trade preferences to Belarus did not, however, result in 
the democracy, pluralism, and market economy that the USTR was 
149. Interview with John Rosenbaum, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade and 
Development (Jan. 2002). 
150. The Pakistan Emergency Economic Development and Trade Support Act, S. 1675, 
107th Cong. (2001). The bill would authorize the President to reduce or suspend duties on 
textiles and textile products made in Pakistan until December 31, 2004. Specifically, the bill 
provides, "The President may proclaim such reduction or suspension of any existing duty on 
imports of textiles and textile products that are produced or manufactured in Pakistan as he 
determines to be appropriate in response to the threat to national security posed by 
international terrorism." Id. § 2(a). 
151. Interview, supra note 149. 
152. Interviews, supra notes 137,138. 
153. Interview, supra note 137. 
154. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative. USTR Recommends GSP Suspension of 
Belarus and Announces Termination of Workers Rights Review of Thailand (July 3, 2000). 
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hoping for.1 Since 1994, President Alexander Lukashenko, labeled 
an authoritarian dictator by the State Department, has governed 
Belarus.156 Indeed, Lukashenko staged a self-coup and consolidated 
his power by abolishing the courts and the parliament in the fall of 
1996.157 Since then, he constructed a brutal police state in which many 
of his political opponents have been imprisoned or vanished.158 
Under his leadership, Belarus' centralized economy became 
increasingly unstable, deterring foreign investment or trade of any 
substance.159 In 1996, the economic relationship between the United 
States and Belarus took a turn for the worse. The United States first 
suspended economic aid to the government in 1996, following the 
wave of arrests after the coup.160 In 1997, the U.S. government 
announced that it would not encourage new investment in Belarus 
and then considered whether to actively discourage investments, 
following a threatened crackdown on private enterprise later that 
year.161 The political relationship between the United States and 
Belarus fared no better; the United States was forced to recall its 
ambassador when Belarus shut off the water and telephones to the 
ambassador's residence and welded the gates shut.162 By 1998, the 
currency collapsed, inflation soared to an annual rate of 130%, and 
average monthly wages plummeted to $50.163 
Lukashenko's brutal suppression of trade unionists prompted the 
AFL-CIO to file a petition to remove Belarus from the list of eligible 
beneficiaries under the GSP in February 1997.164 Citing the U.S. 
Department of State's Belarus Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices for 1996, the AFL-CIO reported that although "[t]he 
Constitution upholds the right of workers . . . to form and join 
155. Id. 
156. Lukashenko has often expressed his admiration for Joseph Stalin and Adolph Hitler. 
E.g., Richard Paddock, Ironfisted Belarus Boss Walls Out West, L.A. TIMES, July 21,1998, at Al . 
157. Id. 
158. Peter Baker, President Claims Victory in Belarus; Protestors Say Election was Rigged, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2001, at A13. 
159. Ariel Cohen, The Moscow-Minsk Mismatch, J. OF COM., Apr. 21, 1997, at A10 (foreign 
investment in Belarus amounted to $4 million in 1996). 
160. Michael Lelyveld, U.S. Considers Putting a Lid on Investment in Belarus, J. OF COM., 
Oct. 10, 1997, at 3A. However, several corporations, including Ford Motor Company, Coca-
Cola, and McDonald's have continued to invest in Belarus despite the hostile investment 
climate. Id. See also Steven Erlanger, A Country Burgers Can't Save, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,1996, 
Sec. 4, at 6. 
161. Id. 
162. See Paddock, supra note 156. 
163. Id. See also Michael Wines, "Bunny" Breeds Rapidly, Sinking Belarus Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12,1998, at A3. 
164. Petition to United States Trade Representative, Labor Rights in Belarus (Feb. 28, 1997) 
(on file with USTR). 
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independent unions on a voluntary basis and to carry out actions in 
defense of workers rights, including the right to strike . . . these rights 
are generally not recognized in practice." The AFL-CIO also cited 
examples of state repression of legitimate union activity, including the 
suspension of the Free Trade Union of Belarus (SPB), following a 
1995 strike by the Minsk Metro Workers Union. Members of the 
Independent Trade Union of Belarus (BNP) had also been repeatedly 
detained during marches in protest of the government's policies in 
1996. In its June 16,1998 supplement, the AFL-CIO further noted the 
introduction of several repressive executive decrees, including one 
entitled "Gatherings, Meetings, Demonstrations and Picketing," 
which prohibited nearly all forms of assembly and free expression.165 
These decrees later became law due to Lukashenko's absolute control 
over the parliament. 
On July 3, 2000, the United States announced the suspension of 
Belarus' beneficiary status.166 What is remarkable about the decision 
to suspend trade preferences to this former Soviet republic is that the 
process from the initial petition to suspension took only 3 years. This 
was quite rapid compared to the protracted reviews of several other 
countries, some of which never resulted in suspension. It appears that 
the negligible volume of trade between the United States and Belarus 
best explains the swiftness of the review process. The value of imports 
from Belarus entering the United States duty free under the GSP 
program amounted to a mere $26.7 million in 1999.167 Compare this 
result to the government's refusal to suspend trade benefits to 
Thailand, despite considerable evidence of labor rights violations, 
after an 8 year review. 
Thailand has long been criticized by labor and human rights 
organizations for its repression of labor rights.168 Among the many 
criticisms raised against the Thai government was its passage of the 
State Enterprise Labor Relations Act of 1991, which banned unions in 
state enterprises. Additionally, private sector workers were subject to 
harassment and union leaders were often terminated in anticipation of 
official registration, at which time the union would be recognized 
under law.169 Despite the merits of the annual petitions to suspend 
165. Petition to United States Trade Representative, Labor Rights in Belarus (June 16, 1998) 
(on file with USTR). 
166. Press Release, supra note 154; Clinton Suspends Benefits, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), July 4, 
2000, at 7. 
167. Press Release, id. 
168. See Petition to United States Trade Representative, Labor Rights in Thailand (1991-
1999) (by the AFL-CIO and the ILRF) (on file with USTR). 
169. Id. 
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Thailand's beneficiary eligibility under GSP, successive 
administrations failed to do so. This is explained, in part, by the 
importance of the trade relationship between the United States and 
Thailand. According to a report issued by The Trade Partnership, 
Thailand has consistently been among the top users of the GSP 
program.170 Indeed, the United States imported over $2.2 billion of 
eligible goods from Thailand duty-free in 2000.171 While the decision 
to suspend Belarus was certainly justified, the motivation to do so 
appears driven primarily by the lack of an impact of any significance 
to the U.S. economy. Indeed, this conclusion nearly is inescapable in 
light of the near consistent failure of the United States to suspend 
preferences to countries that conduct substantial trade with the 
United States, regardless of their observance of international workers' 
rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In August 2002, Congress approved and President Bush signed 
into law a comprehensive trade bill reauthorizing the GSP program 
and its labor rights clause for 5 years. Thus, workers' rights petitions 
under the GSP will continue to be an important instrument for 
international labor rights advocacy, as well as a continuing source of 
controversy. 
Applications of the GSP workers' rights provision have given rise 
to cutting critiques of U.S. trade policy and of unilateralism in labor 
rights policymaking generally. Some international law specialists 
question the invocation of "internationally recognized worker rights" 
in U.S. trade statutes without reference to ILO Conventions, human 
rights charters, or any other sources of international recognition. 
Congress created its own idiosyncratic definition of such rights, which 
excluded non-discrimination — a well-settled internationally 
recognized worker right—and included "cost items" like minimum 
wage, hours of work, and safety and health, which are outside most 
"core labor rights" definitions. As a result, critics argue, the United 
States is frustrating efforts to create consistent international norms.173 
170. See THE TRADE PARTNERSHIP, THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: 
AN UPDATE 4 (2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov. 
171. Id. at 3. 
172. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Trade Bill, Restoring Broad Presidential Authority, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at A5; Trade Act of 2002, PUB. L. No. 107-210 (Aug. 6, 2002). 
173. For a comprehensive statement of this and following critiques, see Philip Alston, Labor 
Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law: "Aggressive Uniliateralism?," in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR 
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL T R A D E (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996). 
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Another criticism is that Congress has set rules for other 
countries that those countries did not have an opportunity to consider, 
comment on, or ratify. The critique assumes greater weight where an 
economically advanced country, such as the United States, sets the 
norms for economically struggling nations, threatening to deprive 
them of a small but important advantage in trade access to the U.S. 
market. The GSP labor rights law is therefore often characterized as 
yet another example of "aggressive unilateralism" or, more bluntly, 
global bullying by the United States. 
A third criticism faults the U.S. statutory scheme for lack of due 
process. Under GSP, the USTR decides whether to accept the case (a 
prosecutor's role), to hear the case (a judge's role), to weigh the 
"taking steps" evidence (a jury's role), and to apply the sanction (an 
executioner's role). 
Finally, critics cite the hypocrisy of the United States enforcing 
international workers rights standards when it has yet to ratify clear 
and internationally agreed workers' rights in instruments such as 
United Nation covenants and ILO conventions, which have been 
ratified by many other countries. Indeed, the United States has failed 
to ratify the United Nation's most extensive statement of labor rights, 
found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. Additionally, of the ILO's "core" labor rights 
conventions, the United States has ratified only one forced labor 
convention, No. 105, and one on the "worst forms" of child labor, No. 
182. It has not ratified those covering freedom of association and 
protection of the right to organize, the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, child labor generally, and non-discrimination in the 
workplace. 
Beyond these flaws in the content of the legislation and the 
procedures for applying it is a more substantive concern, namely that 
the merits of a petition have little bearing on the outcome of a case. 
Geopolitics and foreign policy are the chief considerations in applying 
the GSP labor rights clause, not the merits of a country's compliance 
or non-compliance with the law. 
These are powerful arguments. But they are arguments for 
improving the GSP labor rights system, not for renouncing it.174 The 
lack of a non-discrimination clause in the statute's definition of 
internationally recognized workers' rights is indeed a gaping hole in 
174. For a comprehensive proposal for improving the GSP labor rights system, see Terry 
Collingsworth, International Worker Rights Enforcement: Proposals Following a Test Case, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TR A D E (Lance Compa & Stephen F. 
Diamond eds., 1996). 
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the law, but it results from political compromise inherent in the 
legislative process. The challenge for advocates now is to build 
support for adding non-discrimination to the statute. Indeed, as this 
article was prepared, an amendment adding non-discrimination to the 
GSP labor rights definition was adopted by the Senate and was 
considered by a House-Senate conference shaping GSP renewal in 
"fast track" legislation (now renamed "Trade Promotion Authority" 
(TPA)). However, Senate conferees dropped the non-discrimination 
clause from the bill at the last minute, leaving this goal still to be 
reached by labor rights advocates in years to come.175 
On the positive side, the GSP labor rights clause's inclusion of 
wages, hours, and workplace health and safety is an important 
declaration that working conditions must be part of the social 
dimension in the global trading system. Economic and social rights 
are integral to the United Nations human rights agenda.176 The 
United States' GSP definition comports with this approach more than 
the "core labor standards" approach of the ILO's 1998 Declaration, 
which fails to recognize economic and social rights. 
The GSP labor rights clause is indeed an instrument used 
unilaterally by the United States. But it must be remembered that 
GSP is a preferential program created solely by U.S. law. 
International trade rules allow such preferential programs, which 
would otherwise violate most-favored-nation requirements. However, 
they do not mandate such programs. Industrialized countries are free 
to establish them with whatever norms and procedures they choose. 
Benefits are conceded unilaterally, and conditions are set unilaterally. 
In this context, American workers have a right to demand from their 
government labor rights conditions for preferential trade programs, 
just as businesses obtained a provision denying GSP benefits to 
countries that expropriate U.S. investments, or that fail to accept an 
international business arbitration award in favor of a U.S. company, 
or that fail to protect U.S. companies' intellectual property rights.177 
175. See Edward Alden, U.S. May Press Countries Over Labour Rights, FlN. TIMES 
(LONDON), May 17, 2002, at 10; David Firestone, Senate Grants Bush Authority On Trade Deals, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at Al; Nick Penniman, Follow the Bouncing Congress; It's Corporate 
Reform Thursday, Corporate Cave-in Friday, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 26, 2002, at 10 
(characterizing negotiations between the chief Senate and chief House negotiator as "a meeting 
between the village idiot and the evil genius" and noting that the former "had been steamrolled" 
by the latter). For the bill's final version, see Trade Act of 2002, PUB. L. No. 107-210 (Aug. 6, 
2002). 
176. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. G.A. Res. 217 (III 
1948), International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
177. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2462(c)(5) (West 1999). 
HeinOnline -- 22 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 236 2000-2001 
2001] LABOR RIGHTS AND PREFERENCES 237 
Japan, Australia, and the European Union act in the same 
fashion. The EU, too, has established workers' rights requirements 
for benefits under its GSP program. The EU covers rights of 
association, organizing and bargaining, child labor, and forced labor in 
its GSP labor rights clause. Discrimination is absent, as it is in the 
U.S. system. But so are minimum wages, hours of work, and 
occupational health and safety.178 
A U.S. law comporting fully with international norms ratified and 
applied by the United States is a preferable approach for unilateral 
action under the GSP labor rights clause and labor provisions in other 
U.S. trade laws. The fact that the United States often withholds 
approval of international instruments creates a challenge for workers' 
rights advocates to build a social and political movement to win 
ratification of ILO conventions and UN human rights covenants. But 
this is not a reason to say that the United States cannot act under its 
trade laws to promote workers' rights. 
Procedural flaws are problematic, but not fatal for the GSP labor 
rights regime. USTR's rules for petitioning, public hearing, and 
adjudication reflect standard administrative procedure common to 
many statutory schemes. Judicial review is available in case of alleged 
abuse. Labor rights advocates learned this all too well when their 
lawsuit alleging that the USTR failed to properly enforce the GSP 
workers' rights provision was rejected by a federal court of appeals.179 
The most troubling aspect of the GSP labor rights system has 
been the inconsistent application of the law based on geopolitical and 
foreign policy concerns of successive administrations, all sensitive to 
the economic interests of U.S. multinational corporations. The cases 
examined here —Chile's suspension and reinstatement, Guatemala's 
continuing review, the failure to review Malaysia, the abandoned 
review of Indonesia, the pending reinstatement of Pakistan, and the 
painless suspension of Belarus—reflect the importance of such 
considerations over and above concern for workers' rights. 
Much of this is an unavoidable reality of global politics and 
economics. Any government, especially the United States in its 
assumed role as a leader, reserves maximum discretion in 
international affairs.180 But the labor rights advocacy community must 
178. See Neil Buckley, EU to Offer Tariff Carrot to Poor States, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 
30, 1997, at 5. For text of the clause, see Council Regulation 11541-98 of May 25,1998, 1998 O.J. 
(L 160) 3-7. 
179. See ILRERF et al. v. Bush, supra note 90. 
180. This experience was replicated in 1998 with passage of the "religious freedom" bill, 
where the Clinton administration demanded and got ample discretion to decide when or how to 
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not be content to live with imperfection. They must hold every 
administration's feet to the fire and demand justice for workers in the 
international trade and investment system. This requires political 
mobilization and it also requires patience and perspective. Just as it is 
in a national setting, fighting for workers' rights in the global economy 
is not a "finalistic" undertaking that ends in clear victory or defeat. It 
is a struggle that never ends, and advocates take victories —and they 
hope defeats—in small measures. 
apply various sanctions against countries that violate believers' rights. See PUB. L. NO. 105-292, 
112 Stat. 2787 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (Oct. 28,1998). 
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